We propose a proof-theoretic approach for gaining evi 
Introduction
In recent years parameterized complexity and fixedparameter algorithms have become an important branch of algorithm design and analysis; hundreds of research papers have been published in the area (see, e.g., the references given in [2, 6, 8, 11] ). In parameterized complexity one considers computational problems in a two-dimensional setting: the first dimension is the usual input size n, the second dimension is a positive integer k, the parameter. A problem is fixed-parameter tractable if it can be solved in time f (k)n O (1) where f denotes a computable, possibly exponential, function. Several NP-hard problems have natural parameterizations that admit fixed-parameter tractability. For example, given a graph with n vertices, one can check in time O (1.273 k + nk) (and polynomial space) whether the graph has a vertex cover of size at most k [3] . On the other hand, several parameterized problems such as CLIQUE (has a given graph a clique of size at least k?) are believed to be not fixed-parameter tractable. BOUNDED CNF SAT-ISFIABILITY is a further problem that is believed to be not fixed-parameter tractable (and which will play a special role in the sequel): given a propositional formula in conjunctive normal form, is there a satisfying truth assignment that sets at most k variables to true?
Parameterized complexity offers also a completeness theory. Numerous parameterized problems that appear to be not fixed-parameter tractable have been classified as being complete under fpt-reductions for complexity classes of the so-called weft hierarchy
For example, CLIQUE and BOUNDED CNF SATISFIABILITY are complete for the first two levels of the weft hierarchy, respectively. We will outline the basic notions of parameterized complexity in Section 2.1; for an in-depth treatment of parameterized complexity classes and fpt-reduction we refer the reader to Flum and Grohe's monograph [8] .
It is widely believed that problems that are hard for the weft hierarchy are not fixed-parameter tractable. Up to now there are mainly three types of evidence:
1. Accumulative evidence: numerous problems are known which are hard or complete for classes of the weft hierarchy, and for which no fixed-parameter algorithm has been found in spite of considerable efforts [2] .
k-step
Halting Problems for non-deterministic Turing machines are complete for the classes W [1] (singletape) and W [2] (multi-tape) [8] . A Turing machine is such an opaque and generic object that it does not appear reasonable that we should be able to decide if a given Turing machine on a given input has some accepting path without looking at the paths.
3. If a problem that is hard for a class of the weft hierarchy turns out to be fixed-parameter tractable, then the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails, i.e., there is a 2 o(n) time algorithm for the n-variable 3-SAT problem [9] . ETH is closely related to the parameterized complexity class M [1] which lies between FPT and W [1] (see [8] ).
We propose a new approach for gaining further evidence that certain parameterized problems are not fixed-parameter tractable. We generalize concepts of proof complexity to the two-dimensional setting of parameterized complexity. This allows us to formulate a parameterized version of the program of Cook and Reckhow [4] . Their program attempts to gain evidence for NP = co-NP, and in turn for P = NP, by showing that propositional proof systems are not polynomially bounded. We introduce the concept of parameterized proof systems; in our program, lower bounds for the length of proofs in these new systems yield evidence that certain parameterized problems are not fixed-parameter tractable.
In propositional proof complexity one usually constructs a sequence of tautologies (or contradictions), and shows that the sequence requires proofs (or refutations) of superpolynomial size in the proof system under consideration. In the scenario of contradictions and refutations, such sequences of propositional formulas frequently encode a firstorder (FO) sentence (such as the pigeon hole principle) where the n-th formula of the sequence states that the FO sentence has no model of size n. S. Riis [13] established a meta-theorem that exactly pinpoints under which circumstances a given FO sentence gives rise to a sequence of propositional formulas that have polynomial-sized refutations in the system of tree-like resolution. Namely, if the sequence has not tree-like resolution refutations of polynomial size, then shortest tree-like resolution refutations have size at least 2 εn for a positive constant ε that only depends on the FO sentence. Hence there is a gap between two possible proof complexities. The case of exponential size prevails exactly when the FO sentence has no finite but some infinite model.
In this paper we show a meta-theorem regarding the complexity of parameterized tree-like resolution. To this aim we consider parameterized contradictions which are pairs (F, k) where F is a propositional formula in CNF and k is an integer, such that F cannot be satisfied by a truth assignment that sets at most k variables to true. Parameterized contradictions form a co-W[2]-complete language. Hence FPT = co-W[2] = W [2] implies that there is a proof system that admits proofs of size at most f (k)n O (1) for parameterized contradictions (F, k) where n represents the size of F. We call such a (hypothetical) proof system fpt-bounded.
In this paper we consider the relatively weak system of tree-like resolution. A parameterized tree-like resolution refutation for a parameterized contradiction (F, k) has built-in access to all clauses with more than k negated variables as additional axioms. We show a meta-theorem that classifies exactly the complexity of parameterized treelike resolution refutations for parameterized contradictions. Our theorem allows a refined view of the exponential case of Riis's Theorem: Consider the sequence C ψ,n n∈N of propositional formulas generated from a FO sentence ψ that has no finite but some infinite model. For a positive integer k we get a sequence of parameterized contradictions (C ψ,n , k) n∈N . We show that exactly one of the following two cases holds (and provide a criterion that decides which one).
2a. (C ψ,n , k) has a parameterized tree-like resolution refutation of size β k n α for some constants α and β which depend on ψ only.
2b. There exists a constant γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1, such that for every n > k, every parameterized tree-like resolution refutation of (C ψ,n , k) is of size at least n
We establish the upper bound β k n α via certain boolean decision trees. For the lower bound n k γ we use a gametheoretic argument.
We provide examples of FO sentences for each of the above categories. In particular, the examples for the n k γ case (Examples 15 and 16) show that parameterized treelike resolution is not fpt-bounded.
As discussed, a parameterized tree-like resolution refutation for the parameterized contradiction (F, k) has access to all clauses with more than k negated variables as additional axioms. However, these axioms are not considered to be a part of the input parameterized contradiction; rather they are thought of as belonging to the resolution system itself (whence the "parameterized" in "parameterized treelike resolution"). In the final section of the paper, we consider how such axioms could be introduced to a parameterized contradiction, thus creating an ordinary contradiction ripe for an ordinary proof system. In this manner, we can embed the set of parameterized contradictions into the set of (ordinary) contradictions. Given a proof system, and considering the parameter to be preserved, this embedding itself gives rise to a parameterized proof system. The embedding we consider is well-behaved, in that it preserves the complexity gap of parameterized tree-like resolution. In particular, the pigeonhole principle remains "hard" -in category (2b) -when embedded in tree-like resolution. However, when considered with general (DAG-like) resolution, the embedded pigeonhole principle has refutations of size 2 k n 2 .
Owing to space limitations some technical proofs are omitted. Full proofs and further examples can be found in a technical report [5] .
Preliminaries

Fixed-parameter Tractability
In the following let Σ denote an arbitrary but fixed finite alphabet. A parameterized language is a set L ⊆ Σ * × N where N denotes the set of positive integers. If (I, k) is in a parameterized language L, then we call I the main part and k the parameter. We identify a parameterized language with the decision problem "(I, k) ∈ L?" and will therefore synonymously use the terms parameterized problem and parameterized language. A parameterized problem L is called fixed-parameter tractable if membership of (I, k) in L can be deterministically decided in time
where f denotes a computable function. FPT denotes the class of all fixed-parameter tractable decision problems; algorithms that achieve the time complexity (1) are called fixed-parameter algorithms. The key point of this definition is that the exponential growth is confined to the parameter only, in contrast to running times of the form
There is theoretical evidence that parameterized problems like CLIQUE are not fixed-parameter tractable. This evidence is provided via a completeness theory which is similar to the theory of NP-completeness. This completeness theory is based on the following notion of reductions:
2. R is computable by a fixed-parameter algorithm, i.e., there is a computable function f such that
3. There is a computable function g such that whenever
A parameterized complexity class C is the equivalence class of a parameterized problem under fpt-reductions. The related problem BOUNDED 3-CNF SATISFIABILITY is actually fixed-parameter tractable; this explains why our study concerns W [2] and not W [1] .
As in classical complexity theory, we can define for a parameterized complexity class C the complementary com-
It is easy to see that if C is closed under fptreductions, then so is co-C. Thus, in particular, each class W[t] of the weft hierarchy gives rise to a parameterized complexity class co-W[t].
Parameterized Proof Systems
We say that Γ is fpt-bounded if there exist computable functions f and g such that for every
Note that the problems of the classes W[t] of the weft hierarchy have fpt-bounded proof systems since the yesinstances of these problems have small witnesses. Consider, for example, the W[2]-complete problem L = BOUNDED CNF SATISFIABILITY. Let S F ,τ,k denote a string over some alphabet Σ 1 that encodes a CNF formula F together with a satisfying truth assignment τ of weight ≤ k for F. A proof system Γ for L can now be defined by setting
However, the situation is different for the classes co-W[t]; specifically, in this case, for co-W [2] . We can witness that a CNF formula with n variables has no satisfying assignment of weight ≤ k by listing all O(k · n k ) assignments of weight ≤ k, then checking that none is satisfying. However, this listing requires too much space and apparently we cannot use it for the construction of an fpt-bounded proof system. This result follows by a standard argument in which the computation of a Turing machine is considered as a proof. In view of this lemma we suggest a programà la Cook-Reckhow for gaining evidence that the complexity classes from the weft hierarchy are distinct from FPT. This program consists of showing that particular parameterized proof systems are not fpt-bounded. For such an approach we would start with a weak system such as a parameterized version of tree-like resolution. The consideration of stronger systems is left for future research.
From First-Order to Propositional Logic
Next we describe a translation of a FO sentence to a sequence of propositional CNF formulas. We use the language of FO logic with equality but with neither function nor constant symbols. We omit functions and constants only for the sake of a clearer exposition; note that we may simulate constants in a single FO sentence with added outermost existential quantification on new variables replacing those constants. We assume that the FO sentence is given as a conjunction of FO sentences, each of which is in prenex normal form; thus, we need only explain the translation of a single FO sentence in prenex normal form. The case of a purely universal sentence is easy -a sentence ψ of the form
where F is quantifier-free, is translated into a sequence of propositional formulas in CNF C ψ,n n∈N , of which the n-th member C ψ,n is constructed as follows. Let
we can consider F(x 1 , . . . , x k ) to be a propositional formula over propositional variables of two different kinds:
where R is a p-ary predicate symbol, and
We transform F into CNF and then take the union of all such CNF formulas for (
k . The variables of the form (x i = x j ) evaluate to either true or false, thus we are left with variables of the form R(x i1 , . . . , x ip ) only.
The general case, a sentence ψ of the form
can be reduced to the previous case by Skolemization. We introduce Skolem relations 
The original sentence can be transformed into the following purely universal sentence
By construction it is clear that, for FO sentences ψ, the CNF formula C ψ,n is satisfiable if and only if ψ has a model of size n. Thus satisfiability questions on the sequence C ψ,n n∈N relate to questions on the existence of non-empty finite models for ψ.
Remark 4. Note that the size of C ψ,n with respect to some reasonable encoding is polynomial in n.
Example 5. We consider (the negation of) the pigeonhole principle. Let ψ PHP be the conjunction of the following.
We translate this to the conjunction of the following universal clauses
together with the Skolem clauses
For x, y ∈ [n] we now consider R(x, y), S 2 (x, y) and S 1 (y) to be propositional variables. C ψ PHP ,n is therefore the system of clauses
, and
Parameterized Tree-like Resolution
A literal is either a propositional variable or the negation of a propositional variable. A clause is a disjunction of literals (and a propositional variable can appear only once in a clause). A set of clauses is a conjunction, i.e., it is satisfiable if there exists a truth assignment satisfying simultaneously all the clauses. Resolution is a proof system designed to refute a given set of clauses, i.e., to prove that it is unsatisfiable. This is done by means of a single derivation rule
which we use to obtain a new clause from two already existing ones. The goal is to derive the empty clause -resolution is known to be sound and complete, i.e., we can derive the empty clause from the initial clauses if and only if the initial set of clauses was unsatisfiable.
In this paper, we shall work with a restricted version of resolution, namely tree-like resolution. In tree-like resolution we are not allowed to reuse any clause that has already been derived, i.e., we need to derive a clause as many times as we use it (this, of course, does not apply to the initial clauses). In other words, a tree-like resolution refutation can be viewed as a binary tree whose nodes are labeled with clauses. Every leaf is labeled with one of the original clauses, every clause at an internal node is obtained by a resolution step from the clauses at its two children nodes, and the root of the tree is labeled with the empty clause. We measure the size of a tree-like resolution refutation by the number of nodes.
It is not hard to see that a tree-like resolution refutation of a given set of clauses is equivalent to a boolean decision tree solving the search problem for that set of clauses. The search problem for an unsatisfiable set of clauses is defined as follows (see, e.g., Krajíček's book [10] ): given a truth assignment, find a clause which is falsified under the assignment. A boolean decision tree solves the search problem by querying values of propositional variables and then branching on the answer. Without loss of generality, we may assume that no propositional variable is questioned twice on the same branch and that a branch of the tree is closed as soon as a falsified clause is found, under the partial assignment -conjunction of facts -obtained so far along that branch. When a branch is thus closed we say that an elementary contradiction has been obtained. Note that we consider a node of the decision tree to be labeled by the conjunction of facts thus far obtained together with the propositional variable there questioned. This is analogous to a node in a tree-like resolution refutation being labeled with its clause together with the variable just resolved. Given the equivalence between tree-like resolution refutations and boolean decision trees, we shall concentrate on the latter. Whenever we need to show that there is a certain tree-like resolution refutation of some unsatisfiable set of clauses, we shall construct a boolean decision tree for the corresponding search problem. On the other hand, whenever we claim a tree-like resolution lower bound, we shall prove it by an adversary argument against any boolean decision tree which solves the search problem.
We give working definitions of parameterized contradiction and parameterized tree-like resolution, which we shall use to state and prove the complexity gap for parameterized tree-like resolution.
Definition 6. A parameterized contradiction is a pair (F, k)
where F is a propositional CNF formula and k is a positive integer such that F has no satisfying assignment of weight at most k.
Example 7. Let us consider an undirected graph G = (V, E) that does not have a vertex cover of size ≤ k. We introduce a propositional variable p v for every vertex v ∈ V . Then the pair
Let PARAMETERIZED CONTRADICTIONS be the language of parameterized contradictions. Note that PA-RAMETERIZED CONTRADICTIONS is the complement of BOUNDED CNF SATISFIABILITY and, as such, is co-W[2]-complete under fpt-reductions.
We can now define a parameterized version of tree-like resolution. As we have already explained, we shall give the definition in terms of boolean decision trees. The fact that we can close branches by criterion (2) is equivalent to our having, built-in as axioms, all clauses of more than k negated variables. This represents the difference between parameterized boolean decision trees and (ordinary) boolean decision trees; hence also the difference between parameterized tree-like resolution and (ordinary) tree-like resolution.
Definition 8. Given a parameterized contradiction
P = (F, k),
Complexity Gap for Parameterized Treelike Resolution
We first recall the complexity gap theorem for tree-like resolution proven by Riis [13] . 
Furthermore, 2 holds if and only if ψ has an infinite model.
In the parameterized setting, one can hope that the second case above, the hard one, splits into two subcases. This is indeed true as we shall prove the following complexity gap theorem for parameterized tree-like resolution: 
Furthermore, 2b holds if and only if ψ has an infinite model whose induced hypergraph has no finite dominating set.
By proving that Case 2b can be attained (see Examples 15 and 16), and bearing in mind Remark 4, we derive the following as a corollary.
Corollary 11. Parameterized tree-like resolution is not fptbounded.
If we could prove that no parameterized proof system for PARAMETERIZED CONTRADICTIONS is fpt-bounded, then we would have derived W[2] = FPT.
Before we prove Theorem 10, we need to give some definitions. For a model M , let |M | denote the universe of M . Given a model M of a FO sentence ψ, either finite or infinite, the hypergraph induced by the model M has the elements of |M | as vertices and as hyperedges those sets {y 1 , . . . y l } such that (y 1 , . . . , y l ) appears as a tuple in some relation. (Recall that there are two kinds of relations -the extensional R relations which are present in the original FO sentence, and the S relations that we introduce when Skolemizing the sentence -both give rise to hyperedges.) A set of vertices is independent if it contains no hyperedge as a subset. Given a set X of vertices, a vertex y / ∈ X, and a set A such that X ∪ {y} ⊆ A ⊆ |M |, we say that y is A-independent from X if and only if (i) there is no self-loop {y} at y, and (ii) there is no hyperedge E ⊆ A which contains y and intersects with X. We say that y is independent from X if y is |M |-independent from X; otherwise we say that X dominates y. Finally, a dominating set is a set X of vertices that dominates every other vertex of the hypergraph.
Case 2a of Theorem 10
We provide an overview of the proof method. We begin by describing the method involved in the proof of Case 1 of Theorem 9, before suggesting how this can be amended for Case 2a of Theorem 10. Whilst we do not allow constants in our signatures, we do refer to those elements that have been questioned in the decision tree as constants.
For Case 1 of Theorem 9, we construct a certain decision tree to refute the FO sentence ψ. The questions of the decision tree fall into two categories: I) boolean questions on the truth of (extensional) relations R on the already witnessed constants, and II) questions that ask for a witness to already witnessed constants in Skolem relations S. In the latter case the potential witness may be one of the already witnessed constants, or it may be a new constant. The important point is that this decision tree is finite -of height h and never involving more than m constants -for, if it were not, it would imply the existence of an infinite model for ψ. It is relatively straightforward to turn this FO decision tree into a boolean decision tree, for each propositional C ψ,n , of size at most (max{m, n}) h , i.e., polynomial in n as claimed.
For Case 2a of Theorem 10, we construct a certain different decision tree to refute the FO sentence ψ in a parameterized setting. This decision tree adds new constants in pairs, under the additional assumption that the second new constant is independent from both the first new constant and the set of constants already witnessed. We are able to demonstrate that this tree is finite -of height h and never involving more than m constants -so long as all models of ψ have a finite dominating set. Again, we are able to turn this into a parameterized boolean decision tree, for each propositional
where a is the maximum arity of any relation of ψ and b is the number of relations of ψ (including Skolem relations in both cases). The result follows. We conclude this section with an example of Case 2a of Theorem 10. This specimen provides a somewhat trivial instance, having, as it does, parameterized tree-like resolution refutations not just polynomial in n, but actually independent of n. There are examples for Case 2a which are nontrivial insofar as there the size of a smallest parameterized tree-like refutation depends on n (see [5] ).
Example 12. We consider the (negation of the) least number principle for total orders. Let ψ LNP1 be the conjunction of the following.
∀x ¬R(x, x) (antireflexivity) ∀x∀y ¬R(x, y) ∨ ¬R(y, x) (antisymmetry) ∀x∀y∀z ¬R(x, y) ∨ ¬R(y, z) ∨ R(x, z) (transitivity)
∀x∀yR(x, y) ∨ R(y, x) (totality) ∀y∃x R(x, y) (no least element)
All models of ψ LNP1 have a dominating set of size 1; moreover, every element of the model constitutes such a dominating set. It is straightforward to verify that D ψ LNP 1 ,n,k n∈N has parameterized tree-like resolution refutations of size 2k, independent from n.
Case 2b of Theorem 10
We now turn our attention to proving Case 2b of Theorem 10. Our argument will be facilitated by a game based on those described by Pudlák [12] and Riis [13] in which Prover (female) plays against Adversary (male). In this game, a strategy for Prover gives rise to a parameterized boolean decision tree on a set of clauses. Prover questions the propositional variables that label the nodes of the tree and Adversary attempts to answer these so as neither to violate any specific clause nor to have conceded that more than k variables are true ( ), for in either of these situations Prover is deemed the winner. Of course, assuming the set of clauses was unsatisfiable, Adversary is destined to lose: the question is how large he can make the tree in the process of losing. Note that each branch of the tree corresponds to a play of this game, hence each parameterized decision tree corresponds to a Prover strategy. We will be concerned with Adversary strategies that perform well over all Prover strategies, and hence induce a lower bound on all parameterized decision trees and, consequently, all parameterized tree-like resolution refutations.
When considering a certain Prover strategy -a parameterized decision tree -we will actually consider only a certain subtree in which the missing branches correspond to places where Adversary has simply given up, already conceding the imminent violation of a clause. In this way, there are two types of non-leaf nodes in this subtree, those of outdegree 1 in which Adversary's decision was forced (because he conceded defeat on the alternative valuation) and those of out-degree 2 in which he is happy to continue on either outcome. In the latter case, we may consider that he has given Prover a free choice as to the value of the relevant variable. The free choice nodes play a vital role in ensuring the large size of this subtree, which in turn places a lower bound on the size of the parameterized decision tree of which it is a subset.
Let C ψ,n be the propositional translation of some FO sentence ψ which has no finite models, but holds in some infinite model. We formally define the game G(C ψ,n , k) as follows. At each turn Prover selects a propositional variable of C ψ,n that she has not questioned before, and Adversary responds either by answering that the variable is true ( ) or that it is false (⊥), or by allowing Prover a free choice over those two. The Prover wins if at any point she holds information that contradicts a clause of C ψ,n or she holds more than k variables evaluated true. In this formalism, given a Prover strategy on her moves, and considering both possibilities on the free choice nodes, we generate a game tree, the subtree of the parameterized decision tree alluded to in the previous paragraph.
Henceforth, we consider only the case in which some model of ψ has no finite dominating set. We will give a strategy for Adversary in the game G(C ψ,n , k) that guarantees a large game tree for all opposing Prover strategies.
Adversary's Strategy At any point in the game -node in the game tree -Adversary will have conceded certain information to Prover. He always has in mind two disjoint sets of already mentioned constants P and Q on which he has conceded certain information: initially these sets are both empty. The set Q is to be a (P ∪ Q)-independent set whose members are also (P ∪ Q)-independent from P . In some sense P is the only set of constants for which Adversary has actually conceded an interpretation; all he concedes of Q is that it is a floating set with certain independence properties. If X is a set of constants, let M X be the class of models of ψ that are consistent with the information Adversary has conceded on X. At each point Prover will ask Adversary a question of the form R i (c) or S j (c). The Adversary answers as follows:
I. If all constants of c are in P , then Adversary should choose some model in M P and answer according to that.
II. If all constants of c are in P ∪ Q, and there is at least one from Q, then Adversary should answer false (⊥).
III. If some constant in c is not in P ∪ Q then -if no model in M P satisfies the question, then Adversary should answer false (⊥), otherwise -he should give Prover a free choice on the question.
In all cases the sets P and Q remain the same, except in Case III Part 2. If the Prover chooses true ( ), then Adversary places all the constants of c in P , possibly removing some from Q in the process. If the Prover chooses false (⊥), then Adversary places any constants in c that are not already in P ∪ Q into Q. It turns out that, in Cases II and III, the situation never arises in which Adversary is forced to answer true. In particular, in Case III, it will never be the case that all models in M P satisfy the question. This is vital to the success of Adversary's strategy, and we will return to it later. We must now prove that this strategy leads to a large parameterized decision tree; we will need the following lemma. Proof. We give a sketch proof of the lemma; for a fuller explanation, see Riis's paper [13] . It is important to see that Adversary plays faithfully according to some (infinite) models of ψ, because this means that an elementary contradiction can only be reached by the violation of a Skolem clause. In order to see that Adversary plays so, it becomes necessary to explain why in Case II of his strategy he never loses any of his putative models M P and why in Case III he is never forced to answer true ( ). In Case II, Adversary never loses a model M in M P because Q can always be chosen to be independent, and independent from P . Indeed, if such an interpretation is put on Q in M , then Adversary's answer is forced to be false (⊥).
Suppose, in Case III, that Adversary were forced to answer true ( ), i.e., all models M in M P satisfy the question R i (c) or S j (c). By the floating nature of all elements that are not in P this would generate a finite dominating set of P ∪Q on M . Let us dwell on this point further. Let c be the subtuple of c consisting of those constants of the latter that are not in P ∪Q. Some of the constants of c could have been mentioned in questions before, but only in ones for which Adversary's response had been forced false. Suppose that P ∪ Q were not a dominating set for M , then there exists an element x ∈ M , independent from P ∪ Q. But this element is such that it can fill the tuple c and falsify R i (c) or S j (c) in M (and falsify any questions that previously involved it, which had already been answered false). This contradicts the question having been forced true in the first place.
Recalling that we can only reach an elementary contradiction by the violation of a Skolem clause, we can now complete the proof. Let c be a constant that never appears in a free choice node in our game tree. In order to violate a Skolem clause, Adversary must have denied some S(c, x), for each of the n constants substituted for x. But that his denial of S(c, c ) was forced implies a contradiction. Since c is uninterpreted in any of the models in M P , it follows that S(c, c ) is false for all c in any model in M P . This tells us that M P is empty and, consequently, that ψ had no infinite model.
We are now in a position to argue the key lemma in this section. Proof. Consider the game tree of G(C ψ,n , k). Note that Adversary only answers true in the case that all involved constants are then added to his set P , or, of course, were already there. Thus, at a certain node in the game tree, the number of true answers given is trivially bounded by the size of the set of all possible questions on P , which is certainly bound by p ab . Hence, whilst p ab < k, there must be fewer than k propositional variables evaluated to true. Furthermore, if p + q < n at this node, then not all of the n constants can have appeared in a free choice (since constants that have appeared in a free choice are necessarily added to either P or Q). It follows from the previous lemma that Adversary has not yet lost.
We are now in a position to settle Case 2b.
Proof of Case 2b, Theorem 10. We aim to provide a lower bound on the size of any game tree for G(C ψ,n , k). Since a lower bound on the size of a game tree induces a lower bound on the size of a parameterized boolean decision tree, the result follows.
Consider a game tree for G(C ψ,n , k). Recall that, at any node in this tree, Adversary has in mind two sets P and Q, of size p and q, respectively, and, by the previous lemma, whilst p < k 1/ab and p + q < n, he has not lost. Consider, therefore, any node in this game tree and the sets P and Q that Adversary there has in mind. Let S(p, q) be some monotonic decreasing function that provides a lower bound on the size of the subtree of the game tree rooted at the chosen node; whence S(0, 0) is a lower bound on the size of the game tree itself. In showing that S(p, q) satisfies the recurrence relation
we are able to derive the following statement. Let n, k, a and b be positive integers such that (i.) a ≥ 2;
The result follows immediately from this statement for sufficiently large k (≥ (16a 2 ) 2ab ) and n (≥ 7a + 1). By noting that all parameterized boolean decision trees of Case 2b are of size ≥ 2, we can modify the given γ to one that works for all n, k ≥ 1. Note that the assumption that (maximum arity) a ≥ 2 is innocuous -there are no unary FO sentences ϕ which have no finite models but possess an infinite one, therefore we would be in neither Case 2a nor Case 2b.
Example 15. We consider the (negation of the) least number principle for partial orders. Let ψ LNP∞ be the conjunction of the FO clauses given in Example 12 without the fourth clause (totality). ψ LNP∞ has models without a finite dominating set. For example, if Z is the set of integers, then N × Z under the strict partial ordering (n, z) ≺ (n , z ) if and only if n = n and z < z provides such a model. Example 16. We return to the sentence ψ PHP defined in Example 5. This has models without a finite dominating set: for example the positive integers N, with R(x, y) ⇔ y = x + 1, provides such a model.
Embedding into Ordinary Proof Systems
Given a parameterized contradiction (F, k) we may attempt to derive an (ordinary) contradiction F by directly axiomatizing the fact that no more than k variables of F may be set to true. We may then use an ordinary proof system to refute F . Considering the parameter preserved, we obtain from this embedding a new parameterized proof system. Formally, let PCON and CON be the classes of parameterized contradictions and (ordinary) contradictions, respectively. Let e : PCON → CON be some injection such that the range of e, and e −1 on that range, are polynomialtime computable. let Σ 1 be some proof alphabet and let Γ : Σ * 1 → CON be a proof system for CON. It follows that
if Γ(w) in range of e and (F, k) = e −1 (Γ(w));
is a parameterized proof system (where F ⊥ is some fixed contradiction, say v ∧ ¬v).
Naive embeddings Suppose the variables of F are v 1 , . . . , v n ; it follows that the size of F is at least n. We might try to incorporate the set N k (respectively, N k ) of all clauses involving more than k (respectively, exactly k + 1) negated variables. Both of these fail -though the latter less spectacularly -since the function given by
is not fptbounded. This is because both N k and N k are of size ≥ n k+1 . Consequently all proofs in this proof system fall into the "hard" category with size at least n k+1 . . Denote this set of clauses by N k . These clauses essentially specify a weak pigeonhole principle from n to k and it is fairly straightforward to see that they can only be satisfied if no more than k of the variables v i is true.
Embedding using auxiliary variables
This method of auxiliary variables results in a parameterized proof system whose behavior with respect to tree-like resolution is similar to that of parameterized tree-like resolution. Since the clauses N k can be derived from these axioms in a subtree of size 2 k! , the "easy" case (2a) is preserved, up to a possible factor of 2 k! . Also the "hard" case (2b) remains via the same proof.
We have not defined a system of parameterized resolution, but such a definition would be a straightforward generalization. It is not clear what the complexity of the pigeonhole principle would be in this system, but we can settle the complexity of the pigeonhole principle when embedded into resolution via the method of auxiliary variables. Recalling that the pigeonhole principle falls in the "hard" case (2b) for parameterized tree-like resolution (and also when embedded into tree-like resolution via the method of auxiliary variables), it is perhaps surprising that the pigeonhole principle falls into the "easy" case (2a) when embedded into resolution.
Proposition 17. Using the method of auxiliary variables, there is a resolution refutation of the (negation of the) pigeonhole principle of size
Proof. Note that the case k ≥ n is straightforward; assume that k < n. We recall from Example 5 that the axioms are It is not hard to see that the variables r ij themselves specify a weak pigeonhole principle from n to k and it is this property that we will exploit. Consider the set of clauses F := (¬r ij ∨ ¬r i j ) and k j=1 r ij , for i, i ∈ [n], i = i , and j ∈ [k]. It is known that there exists a resolution refutation F of size 2 k such that no clause (other than the axioms) contains more than one negated variable [1] . We will convert this refutation into one for F ∪N k of size at most 2 k n 2 . First we will show how to derive any axiom of F from We now demonstrate how one may simulate a resolution step on the F clauses in the F ∪ N k clauses. For this part it is crucial that the resolution on F contains no clauses with more than two negated literals. We will first consider the simplest case in which one of the clauses to be resolved is strictly positive and the other contains a single negated variable, that is they are of the form: Each clause in the resolution refutation of F may now be replaced by at most n 2 clauses to obtain a refutation of F ∪ N k , and the result follows.
It may be noted that we could have defined r ij := n l=1 q S2(i,l),j in the proof of the previous proposition. The reason we have used the q R(i,l),j variables is to show that the result stands for the more usual encoding of the pigeohole principle, which avoids Skolem relations. However, our method can be used to demonstrate that any first-order ψ, without finite models, that translates to a propositional system involving at least one non-unary Skolem relation, has a resolution refutation (using the method of auxiliary variables) of size 2 k n 2 . It is straightforward to show, if ψ has no finite models and a propositional translation without a non-unary Skolem relation, that ψ also has no infinite models. Therefore, the method of auxiliary variables has made all of our parameterized contradictions "easy" for resolution. We note that not all contradictions derive from first-order principles, and that this method of auxiliary variables may have more relevance elsewhere.
